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Abstract. There is all the world of difference between voluntary and coercive 
slavery.  The physical invasions might be identical in the two cases, but the ethical 
analysis of each is diametrically the opposite. The only problem with real world 
slavery was that it was compulsory; the slave did not agree to take on this role. 
Otherwise, slavery was not only ―not so bad‖ it was a positive good, for both the 
slave and the slave-master, at least in the ex-ante sense, as is the case with all 
economic behavior. 




n ordinary times, no decent person should ever have to assert he bitterly 
opposes slavery, or thinks its actual operation was anything other than an 
abomination. This should be understood without question. But these are 
not ordinary times. Recently, there have been three publications to the 
contrary, asserting that Walter Block maintains that slavery was not ―so bad‖ 
(Tanenhaus & Rutenberg, 2014; Wildes, 2014; Murphy, et al, 2014). It 
should go without saying that these are false accusations for just about any 
civilized person. But when a libertarian is the target of such a monstrous 
charge, something is more than ordinarily rotten in Denmark. 
How to rebut these preposterous allegations, these vile accusations? One 
way to do so is to look at the record. This will indicate that no libertarian 
could actually tolerate such a despicable institution. 
Block (2013a) stated: ―Free association is a very important aspect of 
liberty. It is crucial. Indeed, its lack was the major problem with slavery. The 
slaves could not quit. They were forced to "associate" with their masters 
when they would have vastly preferred not to do so. Otherwise, slavery 
wasn‘t so bad. You could pick cotton, sing songs, be fed nice gruel, etc. The 
only real problem was that this relationship was compulsory. It violated the 
law of free association, and that of the slaves‘ private property rights in their 
own persons. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, then, to a much smaller degree 
of course, made partial slaves of the owners of establishments like 
Woolworths.‖ 
Block used much the same verbiage in Block vs Epstein (2005): ―… 
Richard's position implies no right of secession. This, in turn, implies 
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slavery. Look, the only thing wrong with slavery was that you could not quit. 
If you could quit, it would be no problem. It's a pretty good deal: You get fed 
three meals a day, you pick cotton and sing a song -and then the guy pulls 
out the whip and you would say, "Wait, I quit." And he says, "No, you can't 
quit." You can't secede from slavery.‖ 
Note the strong parallels between these views of Block‘s and a 
statement
[1]
 of a person none other than Frederick Douglass (1882): 
―My feelings were not the result of any marked cruelty in the treatment I 
received; they sprang from the consideration of my being a slave at all. It 
was slavery, not its mere incidents I hated. I had been cheated. I saw through 
the attempt to keep me in ignorance. I saw that slaveholders would have 
gladly made me believe that they were merely acting under the authority of 
God in making a slave of me and in making slaves of others, and I felt to 
them as to robbers and deceivers. The feeding and clothing me well could 
not atone for taking my liberty from me.‖ -- Growing in knowledge. - 
Frederick Douglass, The Life and Times of Frederick Douglass: From 1817-
1882 (published 1882)  
Douglass published these ideas over a century ago.
[2]
  Given that Block 
stands accused of being insensitive, being too accommodating to slavery, not 
being aware of its horrors and monstrousness, I wonder if the likes of 
Tanenhaus & Rutenberg, (2014); Wildes, (2014); Murphy, et al, (2014) 
would care to level the same accusations at this particular author? 
Block stated,in effect, along with Douglass, that it is not the ―mere 
incidents‖ of slavery that are despicable. Rather, it is the fact that the 
―curious institution‖ violates the libertarian non-aggression principle (NAP); 
it is incompatible with the libertarian law of free association: slavery forces, 
compels, mandates, that the slave ―associate‖ with the overseer, with the 
master, when what he wants to do more than anything else is disassociate 
himself from these evil men. He wishes, in effect, to secede from them, 
which is just another way of putting the matter.
[3]
 
Then, there is the issue of reparations to the black great grandchildren of 
slaves in the U.S. Block has a long paper trail supporting this initiative, 
albeit with some libertarian reservations (Alston & Block, 2007; Block, 
1993; 2001b, 2002c; Block & Yeatts, 1999-2000). That writer has authored a 
stern rebuke to Horowitz (2000) who opposes this matter of elemental 
justice. If Block did not think slavery was in effect kidnapping, the unjust 
theft of a life‘s worth of labor to say the least, he could hardly argue in this 
manner. But, he did, which indicates his long-held views on the horrors of 
slavery. 
Why this sudden hysteria about slavery? In this year of the Lord 2014, 
this can hardly be a debatable issue. How, then, to explain it? This can only 
be speculative, but one plausible hypothesis that must be considered is that 
what is really at stake in this controversy is not out and out slavery itself, but 
rather, more generally, coercion, compulsion, violations of the NAP, and, 
most important, the present trashing of the libertarian law of free association 
as the law of the land. It is clear that at least for libertarians, these are 
precisely the reasons slavery is obnoxious and despicable. It violates these 
foundations of libertarianism. But for that, this institution would be entirely 
innocuous. In contrast, according to this admittedly speculative hypothesis, 
why do our friends on the ―progressive,‖ ―liberal‖ left socialist axis oppose 
slavery? For none of these reasons. Why then? Because it was just plain 
awful. State Murphy et al, (2014) in an attempt to upbraid Block for his 
supposed support of it: 
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―Traders in human flesh kidnapped men, women and children from the 
interior of the African continent and marched them in stocks to the coast. 
Snatched from their families, these individuals awaited an unknown but 
decidedly terrible future. Often for as long as three months enslaved people 
sailed west, shackled and mired in the feces, urine, blood and vomit of the 
other wretched souls on the boat. For many, their desperation became so 
deep, they deemed suicide and infanticide as viable alternatives to a life of 
enslavement. After arriving in North America, labor, coercion and violence 
always occupied the same space. 
―While the lack of free association did indeed characterize antebellum 
slavery in the U.S., the ownership of humans as property is merely one of the 
incontrovertibly unacceptable aspects of slavery. The violation of human 
dignity, the radical exploitation of people‘s labor, the brutal violence that 
slaveholders utilized to maintain power, the disenfranchisement of American 
citizens, the destruction of familial bonds, the pervasive sexual assault and 
the systematic attempts to dehumanize an entire race all mark slavery as an 
intellectually, economically, politically and socially condemnable institution 
no matter how, where, or when it is practiced.‖  
Why this attempt to downplay, seemingly at all costs, the libertarian 
axioms of non-aggression and free association? Because to once allow these 
considerations to take center stage would be to open up the veritable flood-
gates. If slavery is wrong and evil not because it is just plain awful, as these 
authors aver, but rather due to the fact that it violates free association, then 
the question immediately arises, What other laws, institutions, enactments, 
practices, also violate free association? But this issue cannot be allowed to 
arise, at least not on the part of this segment of the political economic 
spectrum. For once it does, a search will begin for other free association 
violations, and when this is undertaken, the candidates will be seen to be 
legion. For example, in section II, we discuss 1. Rent control, 2.Rape, 3. 
Employment contracts, 4. Secession, 5.The so-called ―Civil-Rights‖ Act of 
1964, 6.Taxation, 7.Affirmative action, 8.Divorce, 9.So called public goods 
such as roads, libraries, schools, museums, 10.Immigration and 11.Unions. 
We conclude this paper with section III. 
Let us consider several of these violations of the libertarian law of free 
association. 
 
1. Rent control 
The usual economic arguments against this regulation consist of pointing 
out that with a ceiling price below the free market level, there will be a 
shortage of residential units, less investment in new buildings than would 
otherwise be the case, repairs will decrease, labor mobility will suffer, 
landlord – tenant relations will become exacerbated, more arson will occur, 
the ―market‖ will be seen to have failed, condominiums will increase as a 
refuge from the law, and thus the need for public housing seemingly 
demonstrated.  
But rent control also has implications for free association as well. Under 
this law it becomes exceedingly difficult, if not virtually impossible, for a 
landlord to evict a tenant. Before the advent of rent control, when the lease 
was up (typically after a two year term) there would be no question about the 
matter: the property owner could evict the renter from his premises for any 
reason at all, or, for, literally, no reason whatsoever. Under rent control these 
rights are severely truncated.  Now, this can only occur for ―cause.‖ As 
determined by the courts, this would include non-payment of rent (although 
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rarely enforced within two to three months of Christmas),
[4]
 malicious 
damage, etc. But this is hardly compatible with free association. The 
landlord is forced to ―associate‖ with the tenant he does not, or no longer 
wishes to, do so any more. This of course does not amount to slavery. But it 
is a difference in degree, not kind. In both cases someone is compelled to 
associate with someone else against his will. 
2. Rape 
This barbaric act can be looked upon through many prisms: economic, 
sociological, criminology, law. But libertarianism, too, can register its 
analytic framework on this dastardly behavior. It, too, from this vantage 
point, is a violation of the libertarian law of free association. The victim is 
forced to ―associate‖ with her rapist, against her will. If it is not against her 
will, it is not rape. It is love-making, or prostitution, or seduction. The NAP, 
once again, is the be-all and end-all of the libertarian analysis. There are of 
course some parallels with out-and-out slavery. Masters typically raped their 
female slaves. The main difference is that rape is of a relatively short-term 
duration, compared to life-long slavery. But both violate the law of free 
association. 
The parallels are clear. The only thing wrong with rape is that it is 
compulsory. It is an uninvited border crossing, undermining the sanctity of 
the victim‘s person. Were this act not done against the will of the women, it 
would be unproblematic. As in the case of slavery, with rape, too, initiatory 
violence is the key element. With it, there is a crime; without it, not. 
3. Employment contracts 
Employment at will would be the only labor contract compatible with the 
free association requirement of libertarianism. That is, the employer would 
be allowed to fire the employee (or not hire him in the first place) at any 
time for any or no reason at all. If so, the employer owes nothing to the 
employee. Not one month‘s notice, or notice for any time period at all. No 
buyouts; no compensation; no nothing.  
Present law is incompatible with the libertarian legal code on this matter. 
At present, the employee can quit at any time, with no notice, nor payment 
required. To not allow the worker to depart would be precisely equivalent to 
slavery (apart, of course, from what the owner of the firm is legally allowed 
to do to his employee). Remember, slavery would not have been ―so bad,‖ it 
even would have been quite alright, if and only if the victim of this practice 
could quit at any time, whenever he wanted, and if he were not forced into 
this condition in the first place. To not allow the employee to resign is thus 
to force him into a role all too reminiscent of slavery, in that his rights to free 
association would have been violated. But the identical occurrence takes 
place with the employer cannot be free of the employee. This is a reciprocal 
relationship, the Marxists to the contrary notwithstanding. Then, the owner 
of the company‘s free association rights are being trampled. He cannot rid 
himself of a now unwanted employee. To the contrary, he is forced to 
associate with him against his will. 
Of course, if there are mutually agreed-upon labor contracts the above 
analysis must be modified. For example, if a professional ball player is given 
a multi-year contract, or an academic is awarded tenure, then all bets are off. 
This amounts to a voluntary relinquishment of free association rights that 
would otherwise obtain. Now the athlete cannot be fired
[5]
 and this applies, 
too, to the university professor. 
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Economic illiterates might maintain that the employees‘ so called rights 
not to be fired arbitrarily actually help protect them. This is not so clear. For 
under such rules, employers have an incentive not to hire workers in the first 
place, or to hire only those who are unlikely to fail in their performance. If 
the firm cannot easily rid itself of a worker, to that extent they are less likely 
to be hired in the first place. Instead of a full time employment, companies 
resort to part time labor contracts, or piece work, or contracting out to 
―independent‖ firms. 
4. Secession 
In some quarters, secession has a bad press. People who support the right 
of some to disassociate themselves from others are presumed to favor, of all 
things, slavery. Why? Because the Confederacy tried to secede from the 
North in the war of 1861, and slavery was legal in the former territory. But 
the North, too, held slaves during that epoch. And, as DiLorenzo (2002) 
reminds us, the first attempt to secede from the Union was earlier in the 19
th
 
century, on the part of Massachusetts. Those abolitionists wanted to separate 
from the United States as a protest against slavery. Then, too, the desire for 
secession in Quebec, Scotland, Catalan, surely, can have nothing at all to do 
with slavery.   
Nor can the desires of people in some counties in Colorado and 
California to separate from their respective states be at all connected to the 
issue of human bondage. Indeed, opposition to secession on the part of any 
American comes with particular ill grace given that their own country owes 
its start to, wait for it, secession from Great Britain. 
Suppose there was a world government and the U.S., or Canada, or 
Brazil, or India wished to secede from it and set up a sovereign nation on its 
own. Could these people be accused of fomenting slavery? Hardly. Would 
they be justified in doing so? Yes, if the law of free association is valid, 
since it denies the right of any person or group to force anyone else to 
associate with it. 
How far does this principle extend? Right down to the individual level, if 
the law of free association is to be strictly upheld. For if New York State has 
the right to secede from the U.S.,
[6]
then New York City may separate from 
its parent state. If this is so, then Manhattan may depart from the Big Apple, 
and the upper west side from that borough. But with this principle in mind, 
the square block bounded by West 88
th
 and West 89
th
 streets, and Broadway 
on the west an Amsterdam Avenue
[7]
 on the east has an equal right to call it 
quits from the upper west side, and a single apartment house on that block, 
for example, 215 West 88th Street, may do precisely the same thing. And the 
occupant of apartment 2E may say ―Sayonara‖ to that high rise building. 
To say that this would stick in the craw of our friends on the 
―progressive‖ liberal socialist left or the war-mongering conservative right, 
would be an understatement of the year. No wonder they all find the law of 
free association, to say nothing of the NAP, to be so anathematic.  
5. The so-called “Civil-Rights” Act of 1964 
There are many and important positive elements of this legislation. It 
addressed long-overdue problems with voting, registration, rights of a jury 
trial, racial segregation laws, other vestiges of the Jim Crow era, and other 
injustices.  But, in compelling Woolworths and other such establishments to 
serve meals to people against their will, it violated free association 
principles. Of course, it would be a vast overkill to liken this violation to 
outright slavery. To say that Woolworths was now enslaved to those to 
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whom it was compelled to serve meals would be a wild exaggeration.  And 
yet, and yet, it cannot be denied that there are some parallels in the two 
cases.  
In each situation there are some people (slaves, Woolworths) who are 
otherwise innocent, and yet are nevertheless mandated, against their will, to 
associate with others (overseers, masters, those engaging in sit-ins 
demanding lunch). This will appear as shocking to some. Placing slave 
masters and sit-ins in the same sentence is bad enough, they will aver. But, 
to maintain that they are both on the same side, the bad side, violators of 
rights, is enough to make such people head for the exits. This sounds 
anathematic to most ears. One reason for this is that the owners of 
Woolworths are presumably in the main, white, as were the slave masters; 
on the other hand, the slaves and those seeking lunch against the will of the 
purveyors of meals are both black. But skin color is only superficial in this 
matter. It makes no never-mind what the color is of someone‘s skin. Our 
analytic framework seeks similarities and difference in dimensions far 
removed from mere hue. More basic is whether or not a person or group is 
forcing his or its will on innocent victims. And in this case it is clear: 
philosophical analysis sometimes makes strange bed-fellows. For here we 
have on the ―bad‖ side both white slavers and black sit-ins for lunch. And, 
on the good side, taking on the role of the innocent victim, are found both 
the black slaves, and the presumably white owners of Woolworths, both of 
whom are compelled to ―associate‖ with others against their will. 
And this law was so unnecessary. If Woolworths refused to serve meals 
to African-Americans, other entrepreneurs would have been glad to do so. 
The profit motive is a strong one. Competing restaurants would have earned 
extra-ordinary profits by catering to the now more desperate black 





Why were Jim Crow laws necessary from the point of view of the 
Southern racists in the first place? This is because either the requisite level of 
bigotry necessary for their purposes did not exist in the economy, or what 
was left of the free enterprise system had ground it down. If there was 
enough hate for people with dark skins, there would have been no reason for 
the law to compel segregated water fountains, bathrooms, back-of-the-bus 
requirements, etc. This would have occurred in any case, at least at the 
outset. Why did other bus companies not arise to serve black people who 
were mistreated by extant bus firms?  Where were the competing bus 
companies who would allow African-Americans, and indeed, all other 
people, to sit wherever they wanted on these vehicles, on a first-come first-
served basis? Was this a market failure? Not at all. Rather, it was precisely 
Jim Crow legislation that prevented such a salutary outcome: the political 
powers that were refused to grant a permit to any such bus company. 
6. Taxation 
Taxes, too, violate the law of free association. They force some to 
associate with others in the absence of full agreement. Have people agreed to 
be bound by tax laws merely by living in the territory claimed by the 
government? To argue in this way is to argue in a circle, since this claim 
assumes as correct the very point under dispute: that the state has a 
legitimate claim to the territory over which it exercises sovereignty. By what 
right does it do so? There was never anything like unanimous agreement to 
any such contract founding the nation on the part of the property owners who 
make up the territory.
[10]
 But without unanimity, some are forced to associate 
with others against their will – a necessary condition for outright slavery. 
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Again we see a good and sufficient reason for the law of free association to 
stick in the craw of the statists.  
Williams (2014) puts this issue brilliantly:  
―Imagine there are several elderly widows in your neighborhood. 
They have neither the strength to mow their lawns, clean their 
windows and perform other household tasks nor the financial means to 
hire someone to help them. Here‘s a question that I‘m almost afraid to 
ask: Would you support a government mandate that forces you or one 
of your neighbors to mow these elderly widows‘ lawns, clean their 
windows and perform other household tasks? Moreover, if the person 
so ordered failed to obey the government mandate, would you approve 
of some sort of sanction, such as fines, property confiscation or 
imprisonment? I‘m hoping, and I believe, that most of my fellow 
Americans would condemn such a mandate. They‘d agree that it 
would be a form of slavery — namely, the forcible use of one person 
to serve the purposes of another. 
―Would there be the same condemnation if, instead of forcing you or 
your neighbor to actually perform weekly household tasks for the 
elderly widows, the government forced you or your neighbor to give 
one of the widows $50 of your weekly earnings? That way, she could 
hire someone to mow her lawn or clean her windows. Would such a 
mandate differ from one under which you are forced to actually 
perform the household task? I‘d answer that there is little difference 
between the two mandates except the mechanism for the servitude. In 
either case, one person is being forcibly used to serve the purposes of 
another.‖ 
Yes, it sounds far-fetched in any way shape or form to equate taxation 
and slavery. But it is difficult to deny what they have in common: forced 
association. 
7. Affirmative action 
If affirmative action is adopted on a voluntary basis, it does not conflict 
with free association. If the National Basketball Association for example 
decides to make its teams ―look like America‖ it can refuse to allow more 
than 14% of its players to be African-Americans, since that is the proportion 
in the overall population of this community. At present, blacks are wildly 
over represented on the rosters of the various teams, and they are all there 
based purely upon ability. If affirmative action were instituted for under-
represented groups, then there would be more whites, more Orientals, more 
members of the fat community, more elderly folk, more women,
[11]
 more 
short people, more unathletic people, etc. If the NBA suddenly decided 
without any coercion to have its team membership more fully reflect the 
makeup of America, this would be well within its province.  
However, if that sport league were forced to do any such thing against its 
better judgment, this would be a violation of its free association rights. And 
the same applies, of course, to universities, government contractors, firms, 
restaurants, fire and police departments, etc. That is to say coerced 
affirmative action embraces a small amount of what makes slavery so 
detestable. And, affirm is ubiquitous. It affects millions and millions of 
people. No longer, even, does purposeful discrimination have to be proved in 
order to demonstrate a violation of this law. Any statistical imbalance is 
prima facie evidence of discrimination. If the law were applied across the 
board, the NBA and the NFL would be guilty of criminal behavior. 
8. Divorce 
If marriage is forever or at least until ―death do us part‖ and spouses 
agree to this, they have then signed a contract with each other equivalent to 
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 Neither husband nor wife may then part with the other, 
and certainly not marry a third party. But, in reality, people are not allowed 
any such choice. In virtually all jurisdictions, the state has imposed a one-
size fits-all procrustean bed. Happily, in most civilized domains, couples are 
allowed to disassociate themselves from each other. Under ―no fault‖ 
divorce, they need not even give a reason for departing from the marriage, 
exactly as how ―at will‖ employment would operate.[13]  Under this system, 
bride and groom may associate with each other, or not, precisely as the 
libertarian law of free association stipulates. Were this not the case, the 
spouses would have remained yoked together to each other, in effect 
partially enslaved to each other albeit it in a limited manner.  
However, matters are entirely different with regard to couples who live 
with each other in the complete absence of any contract between them. The 
courts, in a series of cases, have found, in their wisdom, that there was really 
in effect a contract between them, unbeknownst to the two parties: 
―palimony.‖ They can no longer split up on the say-so of either one of them, 
with no strings attached. The scorned party now has the right to ―associate‖ 
with the partner who wishes to end the relationship, at least to the extent of 
obtaining some of his money, which he is not contractually obligated to 
provide.  If the latter is relatively rich, the former may now legally force him 
to associate with her, in much the same way as the taxpayer must associate 
with the government. He must pay her ―palimony‖ fees. Such are the results 
when free association is abrogated. 
9. “Public” goods 
If there is government ownership of roads, streets, highways,
[14]
 
museums, schools, libraries, parks, symphony halls, recreation centers, no 
one may be excluded from these amenities. That is, anyone who uses any of 
them is forced to associate with all others who do so. There can be no such 
thing as full rights of free association on any public property with such rules. 
Thus, we have forced integration of all peoples. This of course does not 
amount to slavery. Far from it. But, the ominous parallels cannot be ignored. 
Both institutional arrangements violate free association. 
10. Immigration 
Suppose that in a given nation every single square inch of it – roads, 
parks, bodies of water, everything without exception – is privately owned. 
Then, if someone migrates into that country without a by-your-leave of a 
property owner, he is guilty of trespassing. He violates the freedom of 
association of the original inhabitants of that jurisdiction by entering onto 
property owned by one of them. The immigrant now associates with these 
people, without the permission of any property owner. Does that mean that 
immigration restrictions are justified in any extant nation where 100% of all 
property is not in private hands? No. Open immigration is the only policy 
compatible with libertarianism under real-world such conditions.
[15]
 For then 
the immigrants need not trespass. They need not thrust themselves upon 
unwilling associates. They can occupy those unowned, or publicly ―owned,‖ 
parcels of land. 
11. Labor unions 
Our union legislation requires employers to ―bargain fairly‖ with 
organized labor. But, suppose the owners of the firm do not want to bargain 
at all with their unionized employees. Posit that they wish to fire them all, 
and use replacement workers (scabs) in their places. May they do so? Of 
course not. For to engage in such a practice would be to rely on their free 
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association rights, and in the modern era this is a non-starter. No, the 
employer must be compelled to deal with the rank and file, fairly, forsooth, 
when he wishes, only, to be entirely rid of this ―master‖ that has been placed 
over him by law. Shades of slavery. The latter was also forced to deal with 
the overseer; whether he wished to do so or not made no never-mind. 
One argument in favor of the present system is that unions raise wages. 
Even if this were true, this could hardly constitute a justification. Assume 
that slavery actually led to an increase in cotton picking. Would any decent 
person advocate slavery on that ground? Of course not. The very idea is an 
abomination. Why even consider it, then, in the context of labor relations? 
Moreover, it is simply not true that unions raise wages. What determines 
compensation is discounted marginal revenue productivity, not ―bargaining 
power.‖ Blood cannot be obtained from a stone. If pay is temporarily raised 
above productivity, until the rust belt sets in, or Detroit rears its ugly head, 
then wages soon enough fall to zero as there are none at all, high, low or 
intermediate.  The companies go bankrupt, or move to more hospitable 
climes, mainly in the south.  
The only accurate way to address the question of unions and wages is not, 
paradoxically, asking the effect of the former on the latter. Rather, it is to ask 
What is the effect of unions on productivity? Posed in this way, the query 
practically answers itself. What with strikes, slow-downs, work-to-rule 
shenanigans, inter-union strife, intra-union quarrels, promotion of hatred for 
the employer, it is difficult in the extreme to see how organized labor can 
ever increase productivity. Thus, it cannot account for rising real wages in 
the long run either. 
 
2. Conclusion 
Let us nowdouble down. Previously (Block 2005; 2013) wrote that 
slavery, in the absence of violence, compulsion, NAP violation was ―not so 
bad.‖ That was a poor choice of words. It was an inaccurate understatement. 
The truth of the matter is that under these conditions ―slavery‖ would be a 
positive good. There, I said it. I will say it again: ―Slavery‖ would be a 
positive good, under these conditions. Make of that what you will, New York 
Times and other enemies of freedom and logic. But note that when I assert 
that ―slavery‖ would be a benefit, two things occurred. First, I placed quote 
marks (―‖) around the word ―slavery‖ and second I mentioned that under 
these conditions it would be beneficial. I did not say, and I entirely reject the 
notion that slavery as actually practiced was anything other than a disgrace, 
a stark horrid evil.  It is my view that the movies ―Django Unchained,‖ 
―Twelve Years a Slave,‖ and the television series ―Roots‖ are roughly 
accurate depictions of this monstrous practice.
[16]
   
Let us discuss each of these provisions in turn. Why do I now place quote 
markets around the word ―slavery?‖ I do so to rule out any possible 
misunderstanding; to obviate the possibility that anyone would see 
similarities between, let alone equate, this system of hypothetical ―slavery‖ 
with the real practice as it actually occurred in the U.S. before 1865. 
What is the difference? Real slavery occurred under duress. The slaves 
were forced into this role against their will. Slavery amounted to nothing less 
than life-time kidnapping. It was barbaric. But in very sharp contrast indeed, 
―slavery‖ without compulsion, without violating the NAP or the libertarian 
law of free association, would be quite different. There still might be the 
cotton picking, the living in a shack, the gruel, and even the whippings, but 
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all this would occur on a strictly voluntary basis. Has this hypothetical 
―slavery‖ ever occurred in history? Not to the best of my knowledge. Why 
then even discuss it under this rubric? This is done to make the much-needed 
point in the most dramatic and compelling manner possible that the problem 
with actual real world slavery had nothing to do with gruel, cotton, etc., and 
everything to do with compulsion and free association violations. 
Is there anything per se objectionable about cotton picking? To ask this is 
to answer it. Of course not. Millions of people the world over pick cotton, 
and no rational person objects. An identical analysis applies to singing 
songs. If this were problematic, then Elvis, the Beatles, the Everly Brothers, 
Pavarotti, Joan Sutherland, etc., would all be victims. It is precisely the same 
with eating gruel. Grits, a similar savory product of the South, is served in 
the finest of restaurants. Nor is it any violation of libertarian law to live in a 
shack. Paradoxically, the same applies even to whipping. Sadists whip 
masochists regularly. This does not offend libertarian law as long as the 
latter agrees to be treated in this manner. When boxer A punches boxer B in 
the snout,
[17]
 a sort of ―whipping,‖ no violation of the NAP has 
occurred.  Why? Because they each consented to associate with the other in 
this manner. For the freedom philosophy, permission is essential. If someone 
agrees to be beaten or whipped, the physical harm may be identical to that 
which occurs under actual slavery. But the ethics of the matter are 180 
degrees apart. 
Could this hypothetical type of ―slavery‖ ever occur? Consider the 
following scenario. A‘s son is sick with a dread disease that will soon kill 
him. There is an operation, or a type of medicine, that will save the life of 
A‘s son, but it costs $5 million and A, a poor man, does not have anything 
like that amount of money. B, in contrast, is rich. He has long wanted to 
have a slave. A and B make the following deal: B will pay A $5 million 
(who will turn these funds over to his child‘s doctor, thus saving his life), 
and then go to B‘s plantation where he will be treated exactly in the manner 
of a ―real‖ slave: he will pick cotton, eat gruel, live in a shack, be beaten 
from time to time, and even possibly killed. 
Would this be ―not so bad‖ for B? No, it would be an unmitigated good, 
at least in the ex-ante sense. Would this be ―not so bad‖ for A? No, it would 
be a definite benefit, at least in the same ex-ante sense. Both A and B benefit 
from this commercial interaction in the ex-ante sense, otherwise they would 
scarcely have agreed to it. How does B gain? He values A‘s servitude to him 
more than the $5 million he paid for this ―slavery.‖ B earns a profit to the 
extent of the difference between these two values to him, in his subjective 
determination. But A also improves his economic welfare! He values his 
child‘s life more than his own freedom, and even his continued existence. 
Not surprising to the economist but perhaps a mystery to all others, A also 
profits from the deal. He does so to the extent that he subjectively value‘s his 
son‘s life more than his own freedom or, indeed, life. All ―capitalist acts 
between consenting adults‖ (Nozick, 1974) are mutually beneficial in this 
sense. 
But what about the ex-post sense? Here, there is a presumption of mutual 
gain, but it is not apodictically necessary. B might later come to think that 
A‘s servitude to him was not worth the $5 million he had to pay for it. A, 
while he is being whipped by B, or killed
[18]
 might regret his decision to sell 
himself into ―slavery.‖ Although he may not, of course. Even in the midst of 
a brutal beating he may say to himself, ―my son is alive thanks to my efforts, 
my son is alive thanks to my efforts.‖ But the same may be said of any 
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marketplace transaction. When someone buys or sells a newspaper for $1, or 
a car for $20,000, while there is necessary mutual benefit ex-ante, ex-post 
this decision may be regretted, after the fact. 
Why call this type of ―slavery,‖ slavery?  Will this not spread confusion, 
at best? Why not characterize it as ―servitude,‖ or ―indentured servitude?‖ 
For one thing, those terms are already taken. They are already in use. They 
already apply to a type of contract that is quite different that the contract 
between A and B. Indentured servitude was typically of seven year‘s 
duration, and such people were more like employees than slaves. Any 
whipping, and the master went to jail for assault and battery.  Killing an 
indentured servant would have been considered, and rightly so, murder.  
For another, this hypothetical ―slavery‖ resembles real world slavery in 
every element: cotton picking, gruel, shacks, whippings, killing, etc. Well, in 
every regard except one: it came about through voluntary agreement; there 
was no NAP violation. This type of ―slavery,‖ voluntary slavery, is totally in 
keeping with the libertarian emphasis on freedom of association.
[19]
 The 
slave walked into this deal with his eyes wide open. He gained from it in 
terms of economic welfare, ex-ante. It was the only way he could save his 
son‘s life.  
More important, and third of all, this is by far the most dramatic and 
compelling manner in which an astoundingly important point can be made: 
that the only thing wrong with actual slavery is that it was compulsory; it 
violated the NAP and freedom of association. It constituted an invasion, a 
life-long kidnapping.  
If anyone still thinks that this analysis amounts to approval of actual 
slavery as it existed, he has an IQ of low room temperature, or, he is 





[1] I owe this cite to that superb historian, Thomas Woods 
[2] Full disclosure: I read this passage after writing the material referenced above (Block, 
2013; Block vs Epstein, 2005). 
[3] For libertarian arguments in favor of secession, see Adams, 2000; Block, 2002A, 2002B, 
2007; Denson, 1997; DiLorenzo, 2002, 2006; Fedako, 2013; Gordon, 1998; Hulsmann, 
2003; Hummel, 1996; Kreptul, 2003; McGee, 1994A, 1994B; Rosenberg, 1972; Rothbard, 
1967, 1997B; Stromberg, 1979; Thies, 2009; Thornton, 1994; Thornton and Ekelund, 2004. 
 
[4] In sharp contrast, if a person were to steal not rental services but a good such as groceries 
or an automobile, there would be no three to four month grace period, where these crimes 
were not punished. Theft of housing services, it would appear, is an entirely different 
matter. 
[5] Unless he violates the contract 
[6] Hopefully, without being characterized as favoring slave-holding 
[7] Murray N. Rothbard lived at 215 West 88th Street, Manhattan, New York, NY 
[8] We assume no ―taste for discrimination‖ (Becker, 1957; Block, 1992, 1998A; Block and 
Williams, 1981; Block, Snow and Stringham, 2008; Sowell, 1975, 1981, 1983, 1984, 2000; 
Walker, Dauterive, Schultz and Block, 2004; Whitehead, Block and Hardin. 1999; 
Whitehead and Block, 2002, 2004; Williams, 1982, 2011) on the part of other involved 
economics actors such as customers, employees. We assume, here, discrimination on the 
part of owners only. For these complications see the literature mentioned in this footnote. 
[9] Suppose white and black productivity for a given skill set to be equal at $10 per hour. 
Without racist discrimination, both earn a wage of that amount in equilibrium. Now 
introduce discrimination against black workers, which pushes down their wages to $7 per 
hour. This is impotent to hurt black employees. For given these stipulated conditions, a firm 
will earn a pure profit of $3 per hour by ―exploiting‖ (that is, hiring) a black worker, and 
Journal of Economic and Social Thought 
JEST, 2(3), W. Block.  p.161-174. 
172 
 
nothing at all from employing a white one. The process would start out with the black 
person being offered $7.01; some other employer would bid this up to $7.02, etc.  Where 
would it end? At $10, or course, at least in equilibrium as it was before. Thus, this type of 
boycott or discrimination is all but totally impotent to hurt the target group. Nor would 
black people suffer even in the interim. This is a hypothetical process. Presumably, if the 
discrimination were of long standing, and not sudden, there would be no initial wage gap at 
all. 
[10]Buchanan and Tullock (1962) to the contrary notwithstanding.For a critique of the claim of 
these authors that there was conceptual or theoretical unanimity, see Block and DiLorenzo, 
2001; DiLorenzo and Block, 2001; Rothbard, 1997A. 
[11] In some quarters it must be considered a disgrace that females are relegated to the less 
successful Women‘s National Basketball Association. On the other hand, if women were 
allowed in the NBA, and to be fair, men in the WNBA, and membership was based strictly 
on ability, with no affirmative action, then there would be no women, not a single one of 
them, in either league, for the best female athletes are not as good in this sport as the worst 
players in the present NBA. 
[12]On this see below. 
[13] We it but allowed by law, which it is not. 
[14] For the claim that private alternatives are not only viable, but would be preferable to 
socialist thoroughfares, see Block, 2009C. 
[15] See on this Block, 1998B, 2011A, 2011B, 2013B; Block and Callahan, 2003; Gregory and 
Block, 2007. 
[16] For a scholarly treatment of this ―curious institution‖ see Fogel and Engerman, 1974 
[17] Not below the belt or biting his ear 
[18] Not murdered. There is no libertarian law against killing a ―slave‖ whose ownership is 
derived in this manner 
[19] There are numerous libertarian theorists who would disagree with this statement. For those 
who support it, see: Andersson, 2007; Block, 1999, 2001A, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 
2007A, 2007B, 2009A, 2009B; Lester, 2000; Nozick, 1974, pp. 58, 283, 331; Philmore, 




Adams, C. (2000). When in the Course of Human Events: Arguing the Case for Southern 
Secession. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield 
Alston, W.D.,& Walter E.B. (2007). Reparations, Once Again. Human Rights Review, 9(3), 
379-392. doi: 10.1007/s12142-007-0055-x 
Andersson, A.K. (2007). An alleged contradiction in Nozick‘s entitlement theory. Journal of 
Libertarian Studies, 21(3), 43–63. 
Becker, G. (1957). The Economics of Discrimination, Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press 
Block, W. (1992). Discrimination: An interdisciplinary analysis. The Journal of Business 
Ethics, 11, 241-254. doi: 10.1007/BF00872166 
Block, W.E. (1993). Malcolm X. Fraser Forum, January, 18-19.  
Block, W. (1998a). Compromising the uncompromisable: Discrimination. American Journal 
of Economics and Sociology, 57(2), 223-237. doi: 10.1111/j.1536-7150.1998.tb03275.x 
Block, W.E. (1998b). A libertarian case for free immigration. Journal of Libertarian Studies: 
An Interdisciplinary Review, 13(2), 167-186. 
Block, W.E. (1999). Market inalienability once again: Reply to Radin. Thomas Jefferson Law 
Journal, 22(1), 37-88. 
Block, W.E. (2001a). Alienability, inalienability, paternalism and the law: Reply to Kronman. 
American Journal of Criminal Law, 28(3), 351-371. 
Block, W.E. (2001b). The moral dimensions of poverty, entitlements and theft. The Journal of 
Markets and Morality, 4(1), 83-93. 
Block, W. (2002a). A libertarian theory of secession and slavery. LewRockwell.com June 10. 
Block, W. (2002b). Secession. LewRockwell.com, July 9. 
Block, W.E. (2002c).  On reparations to blacks for slavery. Human Rights Review,  3(4), 53-
73. doi: 10.1007/s12142-002-1003-4 
Block, W.E. (2003). Toward a libertarian theory of inalienability: A critique of Rothbard, 
Barnett, Gordon, Smith, Kinsella and Epstein. Journal of Libertarian Studies, 17(2), 39-
85. 
Block, W.E. (2004). Are alienability and the apriori of argument logically 
incompatible?.Dialogue, 1(1), 
Journal of Economic and Social Thought 
JEST, 2(3), W. Block.  p.161-174. 
173 
 
Block, W.E. (2005). Ayn Rand and Austrian Economics: Two peas in a pod. The Journal of 
Ayn Rand Studies. 6(2), 259-269. 
Block, W.E. (2006). Epstein on alienation: a rejoinder. International Journal of Social 
Economics, 33(3-4), 241-260. doi: 10.1108/03068290610646252 
Block, W.E. (2007a). Secession. Dialogue, 4, 1-14. 
Block, W.E. (2007b). Alienability: Reply to Kuflik. Humanomics, 23(3) 117-136. doi: 
10.1108/08288660710779362 
Block, W.E. (2009a). Yes, sell rivers! And make legal some slave contracts. The Tyee. July 
25. 
Block, W.E. (2009b). Privatizing rivers and voluntary slave contracts. Lewrockwell.com, July 
27. 
Block, W.E. (2009c). The privatization of roads and highways: Human and economic factors. 
Auburn, AL: The Mises Institute. 
Block, W.E. (2011a). Hoppe, Kinsella and Rothbard II on immigration: A critique. Journal of 
Libertarian Studies, 22, 593–623.  
Block, W.E. (2011b). Rejoinder to hoppe on immigration, Journal of Libertarian Studies, 22, 
771–792.  
Block, W.E. (2013a). Chris Selley is a pussy libertarian; I‘m not. Lewrockwell.com, February 
25. 
Block, W.E. (2013b). Rejoinder to Todea on the ‗open‘ contract of immigration.‖ The 
Scientific Journal of Humanistic Studies, 8(5), 52-55. 
Block, W.E. (2014). Reply to the scurrilous, libelous, venomous, scandalous New York Times 
Smear Campaign. Lewrockwell.com, January 30.  
Block, W.E.,& Callahan, G. (2003). Is there a right to Immigration? A libertarian perspective. 
Human Rights Review, 5(1), 46-71. doi: 10.1007/s12142-003-1004-y 
Block, W.,& DiLorenzo, T. (2001). The calculus of consent revisited.,Public Finance and 
Management, 1(3).  
Block, W.,& Epstein, R. (2005). Debate on eminent domain. NYU Journal of Law Liberty, 
1(3), 1144-1169.  
Block, W.E., Snow, N., & Stringham, E. (2008). Banks, insurance companies and 
discrimination. Business and Society Review, 113(3), 403-419. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-
8594.2008.00326.x 
Block, W.,& Williams, E. (1981). Male-female earnings differentials: A critical reappraisal. 
The Journal of Labor Research, 2(2), 385-388. doi: 10.1007/BF02685295 
Block, W.E.,& Yeatts, G. (1999-2000). The economics and ethics of land reform: A Critique 
of the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace‘s ‗Toward a Better Distribution of Land: 
The Challenge of Agrarian Reform,‘‖ Journal of Natural Resources and Environmental 
Law, 15(1) 37-69.  
Buchanan, J.M.,& Tullock, G. (1962). The calculus of consent: Logical foundations of 
constitutional democracy, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan. 
Denson, J.V. (1997). The costs of war: America’s pyrrhic victories. New Brunswick, N.J.: 
Transaction Publishers 
DiLorenzo, T. (2002). The Real Lincoln: A New Look at Abraham Lincoln, His Agenda, and 
an Unnecessary War, New York, NY: Random House 
DiLorenzo, T. (2006). Happy Secession Day. Lewrockwell.com.  
DiLorenzo, T.,& Block, W.E. (2001).  Constitutional economics and the calculus of consent. 
The Journal of Libertarian Studies, 15(3), 37-56.  
Douglass, F. (1882). The Life and Times of Frederick Douglass: From 1817-1882. Ulan 
Press. 
Fedako, J. (2013). Secession and the bonds of peace and prosperity. Lewrockwell.com, 
January 2. 
Fogel, R.W.,& Engerman, S.L. (1974). Time on the cross: The economics of American negro 
slavery, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 
Gordon, D. (1998). Secession, State and Liberty New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers 
Gregory, A.,& Block, W.E. (2007). On immigration: Reply to hoppe. Journal of Libertarian 
Studies, 21(3) 25-42.  
Horowitz, D. (2000). The latest civil rights disaster: Ten reasons why reparations for slavery 
are a bad idea for black people -- and racist too. 
Hülsmann, J.G. (2003). Secession and the Production of Defense. Hoppe, Hans-Hermann, ed. 
2003. The Myth of National Defense: Essays on the Theory and History of Security 
Production. Auburn, AL: The Ludwig von Mises Institute, pp. 369-414. 
Hummel, J.R. (1996). Emancipating Slaves, Enslaving Free Men: A History of the American 
Civil War. Chicago: Open Court. 
Journal of Economic and Social Thought 
JEST, 2(3), W. Block.  p.161-174. 
174 
 
Kreptul, A. (2003). The constitutional right of secession in political theory and history. The 
Journal of Libertarian Studies, 17(4), 30-100.  
Lester, J.C. (2000). Escape from Leviathan. St. Martin‘s Press.  
McGee, R.W. (1994a). Secession reconsidered. The Journal of Libertarian Studies, 11(1), 11-
33. 
McGee, R.W. (1994b). Secession as a tool for limiting the growth of state and municipal 
government and making it more responsive: A constitutional proposal. Western State 
University Law Review. 21. Spring. 
Murphy, L., Anthony E.L., et al. (2014). Letter: Faculty says Walter Block's claims were, 
once again, untrue and offensive. February 6.  
Nozick, R. (1974). Anarchy, state and utopia, New York: Basic Books.  
Philmore, J. (1982). The libertarian case for slavery: A note on Nozick. Philosophical Forum, 
14, 43-58. 
Rosenberg, J.S. (1972). Toward a new civil war revisionism, (in Gerald N. Grob and George 
AthanBilias, eds.), Interpretations of American History, I, New York: The Free Press, pp. 
459-479. 
Rothbard, M.N. (1967). The principle of secession defended.  Colorado Springs Gazette 
Telegraph (Pine Tree Column), October 3.  
Rothbard, M. (1997a). Buchanan and Tullock's 'The calculus of consent‘, The Logic of Action 
II, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, pp. 269-274. 
Rothbard, M.N. (1997b). Just war, (in Denson, John V., ed.) The Costs of War: America’s 
Pyrrhic Victories. New Brunswick, N.J. Transaction Publishers 
Sowell, T. (1975). Race and Economics. New York: Longman  
Sowell, T. (1981). Markets and Minorities,  New York, N.Y.: Basic Books 
Sowell, T. (1983). The Economics and Politics of Race: An International Perspective. New 
York, Morrow. 
Sowell, T. (1984). Civil Rights: Rhetoric or Reality. New York: William Morrow. 
Sowell, T. (2000). Basic Economics: A Citizen's Guide to the Economy. New York, N.Y.: 
Basic Books 
Steiner, H (1994). An Essay on Rights, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 
Stromberg, J. (1979). The war for southern independence: A radical libertarian perspective. 
Journal of Libertarian Studies, 3(1), 31-54. 
Tanenhaus, S., & Rutenberg, J. (2014). Rand Paul’s Mixed Inheritance, January 26. 
Thies, C. (2009). Secession is in our future. http://mises.org/story/3427 
Thoreau, H.D. (1849). Walden and Civil Disobedience 
Thornton, M. (1994). Looking forward (to secession): Renewing a vision of independence 
and self -government. Vital Speeches of the Day. 15(14), 440-443. 
Thornton, M.,& Ekelund, R.B. (2004). Tariffs, Blockades, and Inflation: The Economics of 
the Civil War. Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources. 
Whitehead, R.,& Block, W.E. (2002). Sexual harassment in the workplace: A property rights 
perspective. University of Utah Journal of Law and Family Studies, 4, 226-263. 
Whitehead, R.,& Block, W.E. (2004). The boy scouts, freedom of association and the right to 
discriminate: A legal, philosophical and economic analysis. Oklahoma City Law Review, 
29(3), 851-882.  
Wildes, K. (2014). Letter: Walter Block has made too many assumptions and contradictions. 
February 6.  
Williams, W.E. (1982). The State Against Blacks, New York, McGraw-Hill. 
Williams, WE. (2011). Race and Economics: How Much Can Be Blamed on Discrimination?, 
Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press. 





Copyright for this article is retained by the author(s), with first publication rights granted to 
the journal. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the 
Creative Commons Attribution license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0). 
 
